Managing Risk in Competitive Intelligence
Executive summary
All categories of market research carry some level of risk. For example, basic social media monitoring always risks being portrayed in the media as Orwellian, posing a reputational risk. Even a methodology as long established as telephone surveys carries risks, such as a misunderstanding of consumer privacy laws.
Much of the perceived risk comes from equating competitive intelligence with corporate espionage, but the two activities are very different from each other. Competitive intelligence is the legal use of secondary and primary research to discover information. Corporate espionage is mostly illegal, and includes techniques such as ‘dumpster diving’ and hacking into computer systems.
The legal risks of competitive-intelligence-gone-wrong are real, but they should not be overstated. Most malpractice of this nature involves companies’ own employees, rather than external vendors. Where cases involving external vendors have been reported, these are invariably lesser-known vendors who as a matter of course choose not to adhere to ethical standards.
Perhaps the main risk of competitive intelligence is reputational. Even if competitive intelligence is carried out in the cleanest way, it could be misleadingly painted as corporate espionage. To the public there may seem little difference between, for example, a researcher legitimately attending a trade show, and corporate espionage at such conferences. However, there are no known examples of reputational damage caused to a company by using competitive intelligence.
Companies can pre-empt the risks of using competitive intelligence by setting and maintaining expectations about what methods the vendor may use. For example, clients can set limitations about what sources may be contacted for research and whether they want to see competitor marketing brochures.
Competitive intelligence is not corporate espionage
Competitive intelligence is not quantifiably more risky than any other type of market research. Competitive intelligence companies have worked on thousands of projects over the last two to three decades, without there being any evidence of questionable practices that have damaged clients. Much of the perceived risk comes from equating competitive intelligence with corporate espionage, but the two activities are very different from each other.
Competitive intelligence is the legal use of secondary and primary research to discover information. The formalization of competitive intelligence as a modern practice can be traced to the late 1980s/early 1990s. A lot of competitive intelligence relies on nothing more sophisticated than online research. Even primary research within competitive intelligence may be equally routine: for example, calling a competitor’s customer to ask them whether they are happy with that competitor’s service.
Corporate espionage is mostly illegal, and includes aggressive techniques such as ‘dumpster diving’ and hacking into computer systems.
The known examples of companies who overstepped the mark in obtaining information about competitors have all involved corporate espionage. Companies that have found themselves involved in corporate espionage include respected names such as SAP and Procter & Gamble, so even the best of companies can be susceptible to such risks.
A competitive intelligence agency would be unlikely to stay in business long if it decided to engage in corporate espionage. Corporate espionage is illegal and unsustainable. It is also unnecessary: enough information can be collected through mainstream competitive intelligence to thoroughly analyse a competitor and create winning strategies.
The legal risks of competitive intelligence
Competitive intelligence combines secondary and primary research:
Secondary research carries almost no legal risk. A competitor’s employees may be listed on LinkedIn. A competitor’s customers may be following that competitor on Twitter, or there may be case studies on that competitor’s website. Information from such public sources is fair game. There are grey areas (for example, if a competitor accidentally uploads confidential documents to a public part of their website, which is then indexed by Google), but these are rare and in such cases the experienced analyst should know that if something looks suspect, it is best avoided.
Primary research carries some legal risk, if not executed properly. Primary research involves contacting people who may have the information required. For example, to find out how a competitor incentivizes their salespeople, a researcher could ask existing employees of the competitor, previous employees of the competitor, interviewees who did not become employees, recruitment agencies and other sources. It may be illegal for some of these people to disclose relevant information (for example, they may have signed NDAs), whereas others may be at liberty to discuss the information. Because competitive intelligence analysts are not legal experts, it is better to err on the side of caution and speak to only the ‘safest’ of sources. In this case, that would actually not even be a primary source, but rather the secondary information available at Glassdoor.com.
The above sources are a world away from the more aggressive techniques that could veer into corporate espionage, such as applying for jobs under false guises or hacking into a competitor’s HR system.
The flagship legislation for preventing corporate espionage is the US Economic Espionage Act of 1996. Its application in different circumstances is beyond the scope of this overview. Indeed, as it has been sparingly used, many aspects of the Act still need clarification through case law, for example around what constitutes a trade secret and whether it needs to be proved that theft of a trade secret caused damage. In some ways the Economic Espionage Act should not be a consideration: if an agency starts wondering whether their activities are captured by the Act or are just outside it, they may be pushing the boundaries of safe practice too far already. Competitive intelligence should steer well clear of the Act, not skim around the edges.
The legal risks of competitive-intelligence-gone-wrong are real, but they should not be overstated. Most malpractice of this nature involves companies’ own employees, rather than external vendors. Where cases involving external vendors have been reported, these are invariably lesser-known vendors who as a matter of course choose not to adhere to ethical standards.
The reputational risks of competitive intelligence
Perhaps the main risk of competitive intelligence is reputational. Even if competitive intelligence is carried out in the cleanest way, it could be misleadingly painted as corporate espionage. To the public there may seem little difference between, for example, a researcher legitimately attending a trade show, and corporate espionage at such conferences.
There are no examples of reputational damage caused to a company by using competitive intelligence. Occasional articles about refer to ‘spying on your competitors’ in an attempt to glamorize what is otherwise quite ordinary market research, but in such articles, individual companies are not singled out for accusations about ordinary competitive intelligence such as public search or executive interviews. Reputational risk is primarily a consideration if competitive intelligence carried out by a company enters the public domain. This could happen in a number of ways:
A company’s competitor may obtain a copy of a competitive intelligence report commissioned by that company, for example as a by-product of the competitor hiring one of the company’s employees. This is less of a reputational risk, because the information will have been legally obtained. No one wants competitors to have information about their business, but it must be acknowledged that competitive intelligence is carried out by all companies, including one’s own competitors. It is a normal part of business.
Information makes its way into the public domain unintentionally, for example because computer systems are hacked or printed material is left in a public place. A recent instance of this type was the hacking of Stratfor’s servers by Anonymous. Stratfor is a publishing company selling geopolitical analysis. Its work is excellent and among its customers are many government departments, defense contractors and investment banks. Stratfor was targeted because, although its work is legal and legitimate, ‘geopolitical intelligence’ can be depicted as something nefarious by its detractors. The company survived the attack, and dealt with it well. In general, the most likely source of a leak is an employee, who may make such research public perhaps intending to damage their employer. Any information that they may release would have been legitimately obtained, but in such a situation, the truth may come second place to a more dramatic narrative. While companies hire employees whom they deem trustworthy, and employment contracts include NDA and similar clauses, rogue employee cannot be ruled out.
Carrying out competitive intelligence has not damaged companies
There is no recorded instance of competitive intelligence causing reputational or legal damage to the company using it.
What does damage companies is corporate espionage. For example, GM vs Volkswagen over the hire of a senior employee, the disclosure of confidential Gillette designs, Oracle hiring a detective agency, Procter & Gamble dumpster diving or the theft of DuPont secrets.
Some of these involved a rogue vendor, but the majority has involved the company’s own employees, for example selling information to a competitor. Where a vendor is involved, these are one of the many lesser-known agencies. There is no record of one of the recognized competitive intelligence agencies being involved in such activities.
Confidentiality and conflicts of interest
One of the obligations of a competitive intelligence agency is to ensure client confidentiality and avoid conflicts of interest. This can be achieved by, for example:
Not working for competing clients at the same time (or within, say, a year of each other)
Not assigning analysts to multiple projects that may have overlaps
Not sharing data of any type across projects
Not profiling one client for another
Clients may choose to share with their competitive intelligence agency their subscription research and analyst reports, as well as news archives and other secondary research. The agency should not use one client’s research subscriptions or other sources, for another client. That would be unethical, break the terms of service of the subscription research provider and put the clients in an awkward position.
Code of ethics for competitive intelligence
The industry body for competitive intelligence is SCIP (Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals). SCIP publishes a code of ethics, which states that analysts should behave as follows:
Continually strive to increase the recognition and respect of the profession
Comply with all applicable laws, domestic and international
Accurately disclose all relevant information, including one's identity and organization, prior to all interviews
Avoid conflicts of interest in fulfilling one's duties
Provide honest and realistic recommendations and conclusions in the execution of one's duties
Promote this code of ethics within one's company, with third-party contractors and within the entire profession
Faithfully adhere to and abide by one's company policies, objectives and guidelines
Competitive intelligence professionals are divided on how robust a code this is. It can be argued that the code is deeply flawed:
The code is partial and vague, failing to provide guidance on the many specific scenarios in which competitive intelligence analysts find themselves. A better example of a code of ethics might be that created by ESOMAR, which includes concrete advice for different research methodologies. A code of ethics that runs to fewer than 100 words is likely to be incomplete.
It is redundant in that most of the limited advice is a variation of ‘follow the law’. That goes without saying, and if analysts truly need to be reminded not to break the law, that points to fundamental problems that SCIP should be addressing.
The code is irrelevant in places, with chunks of it advocating promotion of the competitive intelligence profession. One may question how much value that adds to clients, and whether it is an ethical priority.
It is inconsistent with the codes of ethics of larger and more established research associations, for example on the question of whether mystery shopping is a valid methodology.
A competitive intelligence analyst may also be guided by the codes of ethics of adjacent organizations such as the Association of Independent Information Professionals or the Special Libraries Association, although these are unable to address many situations specific to competitive intelligence. The code of ethics of the Association of Independent Information Professionals is as follows:
Uphold the profession's reputation for honesty, competence, and confidentiality
Give clients the most current and accurate information possible within the budget and time frames provided by the clients
Help clients understand the sources of information used and the degree of reliability which can be expected from those sources
Accept only those projects which are legal and are not detrimental to our profession.
Respect client confidentiality
Recognize intellectual property rights
Respect licensing agreements and other contracts. Explain to clients what their obligations might be with regard to intellectual property rights and licensing agreements
Maintain a professional relationship with libraries and comply with all their rules of access
Assume responsibility for employees' compliance with this code
The code of ethics of the Special Libraries Association is as follows:
Act with honesty, fairness and in good faith in serving and providing value to their employers, clients, and vendors
Provide their employer, organization, or clients with the highest level of service, by delivering the best sources and services possible within organizational constraints and by improving the quality of and adding value to the information and knowledge they provide
Enhance employer success by contributing to the mission, goals, policies and strategies of the organization
Respect the intellectual property of their employers, clients and competitors, and within the legal and ethical constraints of the organization, inform their clients or employers of potential legal and ethical violations in the provision of sources or services
Honor the privacy, rights, and reputation of individuals and organizations in the proper use of information content regardless of format or medium, adhering to the best practices of ensuring confidentiality
Strive for excellence by seeking and maintaining professional knowledge and competencies in intellectual and information technologies in themselves, their colleagues, their organization and other professionals, including education for information literacy
Represent themselves accurately concerning their education, competencies and experience to their employers, clients, colleagues and other professionals
Avoid conflicts of interest while in the performance of their work
Competitive intelligence agencies must use their own judgment when carrying out research to determine what is ethical. In most cases this is very clear, although ethics is ultimately a subjective issue.
How clients deal with the risks of competitive intelligence projects
Competitive intelligence is quantitatively no more risky than any other market research activity. Most companies are content to let their competitive intelligence agencies determine what techniques they use and how they carry out the research. A minority of clients prefer to define jointly the parameters of the research methodology, so that they can be comfortable that they have quantified and mitigated the risk in advance. Companies can pre-empt any risks of using competitive intelligence by setting and maintaining expectations about what methods the vendor may use. Limitations may include:
No employees of competitors to be contacted
No material, such as brochures obtained at conferences, to be delivered directly to the client
The client’s name never to be mentioned or disclosed
Such standards can further reassure clients that competitive intelligence is not going to cause them legal or reputational damage.